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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Shirley Stone-Jones appeals in Docket No. 41513 from the judgment and 
sentence entered upon her conditional guilty plea to possession of 
methamphetamine with the intent to deliver, with a habitual drug offender 
enhancement. She appeals in Docket No. 41607 from the judgment and 
sentences entered upon her guilty pleas to possession of methamphetamine and 
forgery. The cases have been consolidated on appeal. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings In Docket No. 41513 
On May 2, 2012, Boise City Police Officer Jim Cromwell received a tip 
from a known informant that "Stone-Jones was carrying some narcotics on her 
and was on her way to the Home Depot in Meridian .... to buy some more." 
(4/29/13 Tr., p.78, L.21 - p.79, L.4, p.81, L.7 - p.82, L.1.) According to the 
informant, Stone-Jones was travelling to the Meridian Home Depot from her 
house on O'Farrell Street in Boise in a black Chevy Blazer. (4/29/13 Tr., p.82, 
Ls.2-10.) At the time Officer Cromwell received the tip, he was aware that, just a 
few days earlier, Stone-Jones and the informant had been pulled over in Valley 
County and, as a result of that stop, Stone-Jones had been arrested for 
possessing methamphetamine. (4/29/13 Tr., p.77, L.2 - p.81, L.6.) 
Acting on the information received from the informant, Officer Cromwell 
asked other officers to assist him in locating Stone-Jones. (4/29/13 Tr., p.82, 
L.19 - p.83, L.6.) An undercover narcotics officer, Terry Phillips, went to Stone-
Jones' residence on O'Farrell Street but did not see a black Chevy Blazer there. 
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(4/23/13 Tr., p.102, L.8 - p.105, L.5.) Officer Phillips then drove to the Home 
Depot store in Meridian. (4/23/13 Tr., p.105, Ls.6-17.) Once there, the officer 
saw the Chevy Blazer in a nearby Shari's parking lot. (#41513 R., p.135; 4/23/13 
Tr., p.105, L.18 - p.106, L.6.) After watching the Blazer for a few minutes, 
Officer Phillips saw Stone-Jones exit the Blazer from the front passenger side 
and get into the passenger side of a green Toyota Tercel that had just pulled up. 
(4/23/13 Tr., p.106, L.6 - p.107, L.1.) For the next several minutes, the Tercel 
made two or three circles around the parking lot of the shopping complex in 
which the Home Depot and Shari's were located. (4/23/13 Tr., p.107, L.20 -
p.108, L.11.) The Tercel then pulled back into the Shari's parking lot where the 
Blazer was still parked. (4/23/13 Tr., p.107, Ls.16-19, p.108, Ls.1-3.) At that 
point, Stone-Jones got out of the Tercel and got back into the Blazer. (4/23/13 
Tr., p.108, Ls.1-3.) The Blazer then left the parking lot and got on the eastbound 
freeway, headed toward Boise. (4/23/13 Tr., p.108, Ls.3-16.) 
Officer Phillips followed the Blazer from the Shari's parking lot to a 
residence on Gowen Road, where the Blazer stayed for 10 to 15 minutes. 
(#41513 R., p.135; 4/23/13 Tr., p. 108, L.12 - p.109, L.5.) After leaving the 
Gowen Road residence, the Blazer got back on the freeway, headed toward the 
inbound connector. (4/23/13 Tr., p.109, Ls.6-10.) The officer again followed the 
Blazer and observed the driver commit multiple traffic infractions. (#41513 R., 
p.135; 4/23/13 Tr., p.109, L.17 - p.111, L.11.) Officer Phillips relayed his 
observations to Officer Cromwell, who then started following the Blazer in a 
marked patrol car. (#41513 R., p.135; 4/23/13 Tr., p.109, Ls.11-16, p.111, L.11 
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- p.112, L.6, p.112, L.25 - p.113, L.3; 4/29/13 Tr., p.84, Ls.3-13.) After 
observing the driver of the Blazer commit another traffic infraction, Officer 
Cromwell effectuated a traffic stop. (#41513 R., p.135; 4/23/13 Tr., p.112, Ls.7-
10; 4/29/13 Tr., p.84, L.14 - p.85, L.5, p.121, Ls.1-21.) Boise Police Officer 
Steven Martinez and K-9 Officer Kelly Montoya also responded and assisted with 
the stop. (#41513 R., pp.135-36; 4/23/13 Tr., p.76, L.22-p.77, L.5, p.112, L.18 
- p.113, L.7; 4/29/13 Tr., p.7, L.20 - p.8, L.12, p.50, L.22 - p.51, L.15, p.61, 
Ls.13-16, p.121, L.22-p.122, L.4.) 
Officer Cromwell approached the Blazer and made contact with the driver, 
who was identified as Chris Mclellen. 1 (4/29/13 Tr., p.85, Ls.19-22.) Although 
the temperature outside was only "in the 50s," Mclellen "had beads of sweat on 
his forehead" and his head and hands were shaking, "almost like tremors." 
(#41513 R., pp.135-36; 4/29/13 Tr., p.85, L.19 - p.86, L.14.) Suspecting 
Mclellen might be under the influence of methamphetamine or some other 
stimulant, Officer Cromwell called for assistance from Officer Robert Gibson, a 
"night STEP officer[] who specializes in DUls." (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., 
p.86, L.15 - p.87, L.21, p.89, L.6 - p.90, L.16, p.91, Ls.17-20.) Before Officer 
Gibson arrived, Officer Cromwell asked Mclellen to step out of the vehicle. 
(4/29/13 Tr., p.91, Ls.21-25.) As Mclellen stepped out of the Blazer, Officer 
1 Mclellen's name is spelled differently at various parts of the record and 
transcripts. For purposes of this brief, the state adopts the spelling that, as 
noted by defense counsel below, appears in the police reports pertaining the 
May 2, 2012 traffic stop. (See 4/23/13 Tr., p.17, Ls.14-24; PSI, pp.27-30.) 
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Cromwell observed a large bulge in Mclellen's pocket. (4/29/13 Tr., p.92, Ls.1-
9.) Mclellen told the officer the bulge "was money." (4/29/13 Tr., p.92, Ls.10-
13.) With Mclellen's permission, Officer Cromwell reached into Mclellen's 
pocket and pulled out a roll of $1400.00 in cash, an amount the officer knew to 
be consistent with the approximate price of one ounce of methamphetamine. 
(4/29/13 Tr., p.92, L.14 - p.93, L.25.) 
While Officer Cromwell was speaking to Mclellen, Officer Martinez 
approached the passenger side of the Blazer, made contact with Stone-Jones, 
and asked her to step out of the vehicle. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.9, L.3 
- p.10, L.1.) Stone-Jones complied and exited the vehicle carrying her purse. 
(#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.10, L.2 - p.11, L.7.) 
After Stone-Jones and Mclellen were both out of the vehicle, and while 
officers were still waiting for DUI Officer Gibson to arrive, Officer Montoya walked 
his drug detection dog, Jax, around the Blazer. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., 
p.19, L.25 - p.20, L.13, p.52, L.12 - p.53, L.7, p.94, Ls.1-6.) Jax twice alerted 
on the front bumper. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.53, Ls.8-14.) Officers 
Montoya and Cromwell searched the interior of the Blazer but did not find any 
drugs. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.53, Ls.15-19, p.94, Ls.16-25.) 
Shortly after officers searched the Blazer, DUI Officer Gibson arrived on 
scene and administered a number of field sobriety tests (FSTs) to Mclellen. 
(#41513 R., p.136; 4/23/13 Tr., p.76, L.18 - p.84, L.14; 4/29/13 Tr., p.16, Ls.4-
15.) Stone-Jones sat on the on the sidewalk curb while Mclellen performed the 
FSTs. (4/23/13 Tr., p.85, Ls.6-15.) Ultimately, Officer Gibson determined 
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Mclellen was not under the influence of any drugs or alcohol and he had 
Mclellen sit on the sidewalk curb, next to Stone-Jones. (#41513 R., p.136; 
4/23/13 Tr., p.84, L.15-p.85, L.15.) 
. At approximately the same time Officer Gibson completed his DUI 
investigation of Mclellen, Officer Cromwell asked Stone-Jones to step away 
from the curb so he could speak to her. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.21, L.5 
- p.22, L.16, p.95, L.15 - p.96, L.11.) As Stone-Jones stood up, the officer 
noted she still had her purse with her, and it appeared to the officer to be full. 
(4/29/13 Tr., p.96, L.17 - p.97, L.14.) Concerned that the purse might contain a 
weapon, Officer Cromwell gave Stone-Jones two options: either leave the purse 
where she had been seated or allow the officer to search the purse for weapons. 
(#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.97, L.15 - p.98, L.15.) Stone-Jones opted to 
leave the purse behind while she talked to the officer, and she told Mclellen to 
"babysit" it for her. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.22, L.17 - p.24, L.19, p.99, 
Ls.12-22, p.100, Ls.4-14.) 
While Officer Cromwell was speaking to Stone-Jones, Officer Montoya 
had Jax conduct an area sniff of the sidewalk where Mclellen and Stone-Jones' 
purse were sitting. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.54, L.18 - p.55, LS.) Jax 
alerted on the purse, which was sitting on the ground. (#41513 R., p.136; 
4/29/13 Tr., p.54, L.18 - p.55, L.1, p.56, L.16 - p.57, L.10.) Officer Cromwell 
thereafter asked Stone-Jones for consent to search the purse, but Stone-Jones 
declined. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.101, L.12 - p.102, L.4.) The officer 
then explained to Stone-Jones that she could either consent to a search of her 
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purse or the officers would seize the purse and apply for a search warrant. 
(#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.102, L.5 - p.103, L.21.) Stone-Jones chose 
the latter option and told Officer Cromwell to "just take" the purse. (#41513 R., 
p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.103, Ls.22-24.) The detention ended at that point and 
Stone-Jones and Mclellen left in Mclellen's vehicle. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 
Tr., p.103, L.25 - p.104, L.16.) 
The next day, Officer Cromwell applied for and obtained a warrant to 
search Stone-Jones' purse. (#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.104, L.17-p.105, 
L.24.) The officer searched the purse and found several baggies of 
methamphetamine, scales, cash, a "pay/owe" sheet, and drug paraphernalia. 
(#41513 R., pp.136-37; 4/29/13 Tr., p.105, L.25-p.106, L.24; PSI, p.332.) 
The state charged Stone-Jones with possession of methamphetamine 
with the intent to deliver, possession of drug paraphernalia, and a habitual drug 
offender enhancement. (#41513 R., pp.38-39, 53-54, 147-50.) Stone-Jones 
filed a motion to suppress, arguing, inter a/ia, that the evidence against her was 
the fruit of an unlawfully extended traffic stop. (#41513 R., pp.65-78.) The 
district court denied the motion, ruling the length of the stop was constitutionally 
reasonable. (#41513 R., pp.135-42.) Stone-Jones thereafter entered a 
conditional guilty plea to possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver 
and being a habitual drug offender, specifically reserving the right to appeal the 
denial of her suppression motion. (#41513 R., pp.151-59.) The district court 
2 PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file 
"Stone-JonesPSI. pdf." 
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accepted Stone-Jones' plea and imposed a unified sentence of 25 years, with 
three years fixed. (#41513 R., pp.170-74.) Stone-Jones timely appealed. 
(#41513 R., pp.178-81.) 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings in Docket 41607 
While Stone-Jones was out on bond in Docket 41513, officers executed a 
search warrant at her residence and found in her bedroom a cache of 
contraband that included methamphetamine, glass pipes, used syringes, glass 
vials, zip lock baggies, a digital scale, several color copies of a $100 bill, and a 
computer and printer, on top of which was a counterfeit $100 bill. (PSI, pp.4-5, 
53, 56-57.) The state charged Stone-Jones with possession of 
methamphetamine, forgery, possession of drug paraphernalia, and a habitual 
drug offender enhancement. (#41607 R., pp.28-29, 37-38.) Pursuant to a plea 
agreement, Stone-Jones pied guilty to possessing methamphetamine and 
forgery, and the state dismissed the paraphernalia charge and the enhancement. 
(#41607 R., p.67; 8/15/13 Tr., p.5, L.9-p.28, L.1.) The district court imposed a 
unified sentence of seven years, with four years fixed, on the possession count, 
and a concurrent unified sentence of 14 years, with four years fixed, on the 
forgery count, and it ordered the sentences to run concurrently with Stone-Jones' 
sentence in Docket 41513. (#41607 R., pp.70-74.) Stone-Jones timely 
appealed. (#41607 R., pp.78-80.) 
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ISSUES 
Stone-Jones states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err when it denied Ms. Stone-Jones's 
motion to suppress? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed 
concurrent, unified sentences of twenty-five years, with three 
years fixed; seven years, with four years fixed; and fourteen 
years, with four years fixed, following Ms. Stone-Jones's 
pleas of guilty to possession of a controlled substance with 
the intent to deliver, possession of a controlled substance, 
and forgery? 
(Appellant's brief, p.8.) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Has Stone-Jones failed to show error in the denial of her motion to 
suppress? 
2. Has Stone-Jones failed to show her sentences are excessive under any 
reasonable view of the facts? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Stone-Jones Has Failed To Show Error In The Denial Of Her Motion To 
Suppress 
A. Introduction 
Stone-Jones challenges the denial of her suppression motion in Docket 
No. 41513, arguing as she did below that the evidence against her was the fruit 
of an unlawfully prolonged detention. (Appellant's brief, pp. 9-15.) Stone-Jones' 
argument fails. Correct application of the law to the undisputed facts supports 
the district court's determination that the length of the detention was 
constitutionally reasonable. 
B. Standard Of Review 
On review of a ruling on a motion to suppress, the appellate court defers 
to the trial court's findings of fact unless clearly erroneous but exercises free 
review of the trial court's determination as to whether constitutional standards 
have been satisfied in light of the facts. State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 810, 
203 P.3d 1203, 1209 (2009); State v. Henage, 143 Idaho 655, 658, 152 P.3d 16, 
19 (2007). 
C. The Length Of The Detention Was Constitutionally Reasonable 
It is well-settled that the stop of a vehicle constitutes an investigative 
detention subject to Fourth Amendment requirements and is "analyzed under the 
principles set forth in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 
(1968)." State v. Grantham, 146 Idaho 490, 496, 198 P.3d 128, 134 (Ct. App. 
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2008) (citations omitted). Under Terry, an investigative detention must be 
supported by reasonable articulable suspicion that criminal activity is underway. 
State v. Gallegos, 120 Idaho 894, 896, 821 P.2d 949, 951 (1991). The 
"reasonable suspicion" standard is an objective test that is satisfied if law 
enforcement can articulate specific facts which, along with the reasonable 
inferences from those facts, justify the suspicion that the person detained is or 
has been involved in criminal activity. State v. Nickerson, 132 Idaho 406, 408, 
973 P.2d 758, 760 (Ct. App. 1999). Reasonable suspicion is a less demanding 
standard than probable cause. Gallegos, 120 Idaho at 896, 821 P.2d at 951. 
Whether the officer had the requisite reasonable suspicion to detain a citizen is 
determined on the basis of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Van Dorne, 
139 Idaho 961,964, 88 P.3d 780,783 (Ct. App. 2004). 
"An investigative detention must be temporary and last no longer than 
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop." Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496, 
198 P.3d at 134 (citations omitted). ''There is no rigid time limit for determining 
when a detention has lasted longer than necessary; rather, a court must consider 
the scope of the detention and the law enforcement purposes to be served, as 
well as the duration of the stop." & The court must also consider whether the 
officer's observations during the encounter "and events succeeding the stop" 
gave rise to "legitimate reasons for particularized lines of inquiry and further 
investigation" which justified expanding the investigation to other possible crimes. 
&; see also State v. Brumfield, 136 Idaho 913, 916, 42 P.3d 706, 709 (Ct. App. 
2001). 
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In this case, Stone-Jones does not challenge the constitutionality of the 
initial traffic stop of the vehicle in which she was a passenger, the search of the 
vehicle following the alert by the drug dog, or the DUI investigation of the driver, 
Chris Mclellen. (See generally Appellant's brief, pp.9-15.) She contends, 
however, that once Mclellen passed the FSTs, 
the purpose of the stop was accomplished. At that point, Officer 
Cromwell should have let them both go. Instead, his questioning, 
and Jax's dog sniff [of Stone-Jones' purse], impermissibly extended 
the detention. The drug investigation was over once the vehicle 
had been searched. The DUI investigation was over once Mr. 
McQuellan [sic] passed the field sobriety tests. At that point, any 
further questioning was unconstitutional. 
(Appellant's brief, p.14.) Stone-Jones' argument is without merit. Despite her 
conclusory assertions to the contrary, the undisputed facts of this case show 
that, even after the vehicle was searched and Mclellen passed the FSTs, 
officers continued to have an objectively reasonable basis to suspect Stone-
Jones and Mclellen were involved in illegal drug activity. That officers continued 
to investigate that possible illegal activity by briefly questioning Stone-Jones and, 
at the same time, having the drug dog sniff the area where Stone-Jones left her 
purse, did not unlawfully extend the detention. See Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496-
97, 198 P.3d at 134-35 (officer justified in expanding scope of traffic stop where 
occupants of vehicle exhibited physical signs of methamphetamine use); 
Brumfield, 136 Idaho at 917, 42 P.3d at 710 (lengthening of traffic stop to wait for 
arrival of drug dog not unlawful where officers had reasonable suspicion of drug 
crime). 
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It is undisputed that officers stopped the vehicle in which Stone-Jones 
was a passenger after: (1) learning from another law enforcement agent that 
Stone-Jones had recently been arrested for possessing methamphetamine 
(4/29/13 Tr., p.77, L.2 - p.81, L.6); (2) receiving information from a known 
informant that Stone-Jones would be involved in illegal narcotics activity at the 
Home Depot in Meridian that evening (4/29/13 Tr., p.78, L.21 - p.79, L.4, p.81, 
L. 7 - p.82, L.1 O); (3) observing Stone-Jones and the driver of the vehicle engage 
in suspicious activity in the parking lot of the complex in which the Home Depot 
was located (#41513 R., p.135); and (4) observing the driver of the vehicle 
commit multiple traffic infractions (#41513 R., p.135). Considered in their totality, 
these facts were alone sufficient to supply the officers with reasonable suspicion 
that Stone-Jones and Mclellen may be involved in illegal drug activity. See 
State v. Widner, 155 Idaho 840, 317 P.3d 737 (Ct. App. 2013) (review denied) 
(traffic stop based on suspicion of illegal drug activity justified where officers 
knew defendant had previously sold marijuana, received a tip that defendant 
would be traveling at a particular time and place in a particular vehicle to 
purchase more marijuana, and independently verified some of the details of the 
tip). That suspicion was only heightened when, during the traffic stop, Mclellen 
displayed physical signs - sweating and tremors - that led officer Cromwell to 
suspect he was under the influence of methamphetamine or some other 
stimulant. (#41513 R., pp.135-36; 4/29/13 Tr., p.85, L.19 - p.87, L.21.) Also 
adding to the suspicion of illegal drug activity were the facts that a drug dog 
alerted on the exterior of the vehicle and Mclellen had in his possession a "roll" 
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of $1400.00 cash - an amount Officer Cromwell knew from his training and 
experience to be the approximate price of one ounce of methamphetamine. 
(#41513 R., p.136; 4/29/13 Tr., p.92, L.14-p.93, L.25.) 
Considered in their totality, the above facts clearly gave the officers 
reasonable suspicion to expand the scope of the traffic stop for the purpose of 
investigating whether Stone-Jones and Mclellen were involved in drug-related 
activities. Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496-97, 198 P.3d at 134-35; Brumfield, 136 
Idaho at 917, 42 P.3d at 710. Stone-Jones appears to concede this point but 
argues that, once the officers searched the vehicle and found no drugs in it, 
"[t]he drug investigation was over." (Appellant's brief, p.14.) Stone-Jones is 
incorrect. While the absence of drugs in the vehicle following the dog alert is 
certainly a factor to consider in determining whether officers were justified in 
continuing their investigation, that fact alone does not overcome the other 
information that gave officers reason to suspect that Stone-Jones and Mclellen 
might not only possess and/or be using drugs, but might also have recently 
bought and/or sold drugs as well. Compare State v. Anderson, 154 Idaho 703, 
302 P.3d 328 (2012) (probable cause established by dog alert on exterior of 
vehicle did not dissipate merely because dog did not also alert inside the vehicle 
where additional circumstances known to officers added to the probable cause 
determination). 
Again, before they even effectuated the traffic stop, officers in this case 
knew that Stone-Jones had recently been arrested for possessing 
methamphetamine, and they had received a tip that Stone-Jones would be 
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engaging in a drug transaction in the parking lot of the Meridian Home Depot that 
evening. (#41513 R., p.135; 4/29/13 Tr., p.77, L.2 - p.82, L.10.) An officer 
independently corroborated the tip when he observed Stone-Jones and Mclellen 
engage in suspicious activity in the Home Depot complex parking lot. (#41513 
R., p.135.) When Mclellen and Stone-Jones left the parking lot, the officer 
followed them to a residence on Gowen Road, where they stayed for only 15 
minutes before heading toward downtown Boise. (#41513 R., p.135; 4/23/13 Tr., 
p.108, L.12 - p.109, L.10.) When officers did make contact with Stone-Jones 
and Mclellen, a drug dog alerted on the vehicle and Mclellen had a "roll" of 
$1400.00 cash in his pocket, an amount that happened to correspond with the 
approximate price of one ounce of methamphetamine. (#41513 R., p.136; 
4/29/13 Tr., p.92, L.14 - p.93, L.25.) Collectively, these facts could reasonably 
lead officers to suspect that Stone-Jones and Mclellen had engaged in an illegal 
drug transaction at the Home Depot parking lot. This suspicion was not dispelled 
merely because officers did not find any drugs in the vehicle. Indeed, given all 
the circumstances, it was reasonable to suspect that Stone-Jones and Mclellen 
sold any methamphetamine they had in the vehicle at either the Home Depot 
parking lot or the Gowen Road residence, or, alternatively, that Stone-Jones was 
concealing the methamphetamine in the purse she carried with her when she 
exited the vehicle. Either way, the information confronting the officers was 
sufficient to supply them with reasonable suspicion justifying an extension of the 
traffic stop for the purpose of continuing their drug investigation. 
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The district court found, based on the totality of the circumstances, that 
officers did not unjustifiably prolong the traffic stop by questioning Stone-Jones 
and, at the same time, having the drug dog sniff the area where her purse was 
located. This determination is supported by the record, which shows that the 
information available to the officers before the traffic stop, combined with the 
officers' observations, general inquiries, and events following the stop, gave rise 
to legitimate reasons for further investigation into suspected drug activity. 
Grantham, 146 Idaho at 496-97, 198 P.3d at 134-35; Brumfield, 136 Idaho at 
917, 42 P.3d at 710. Stone-Jones has failed to establish any basis for reversal 
of the district court's order denying her motion to suppress. 
11. 
Stone-Jones Has Failed To Show An Abuse Of Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
After Stone-Jones pied guilty to possessing methamphetamine with the 
intent to deliver and a habitual drug offender enhancement in Docket 41513 and 
to possessing methamphetamine and forgery in Docket 41607, the district court 
imposed concurrent unified sentences of 25 years, with three years fixed; seven 
years, with four years fixed; and 14 years, with four years fixed, respectively. 
(#41513 R., pp.170-74; #41607 R., pp.70-74.) Stone-Jones challenges her 
sentences on appeal, arguing the district court did not "adequately consider[]" 
several factors she claims are mitigating. (Appellant's brief, pp.15-23.) The 
record, however, supports the sentences imposed; Stone-Jones has failed to 
establish an abuse of discretion. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). The appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that the 
sentencing court abused its discretion. kl 
C. Stone-Jones Has Failed To Show Her Sentences Are Excessive Under 
Any Reasonable View Of The Facts 
Where a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellant bears the burden 
of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion. State v. Baker, 136 Idaho 
576, 577, 38 P.3d 614, 615 (2001) (citing State v. Lundquist, 134 Idaho 831, 11 
P.3d 27 (2000)). To carry this burden the appellant must show that the sentence 
is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Baker, 136 Idaho at 577, 
38 P.3d at 615. A sentence is reasonable if it appears necessary to achieve the 
primary objective of protecting society or any of the related sentencing goals of 
deterrence, rehabilitation or retribution. kl 
"[T]he most fundamental requirement [of sentencing] is reasonableness." 
Statev. Miller, 151 Idaho 828,834,264 P.3d 935,941 (2011) (quotations and 
citation omitted). "When reviewing the reasonableness of a sentence this Court 
will make an independent examination of the record, having regard to the nature 
of the offense, the character of the offender and the protection of the public 
interest." kl Contrary to Stone-Jones' arguments on appeal, an examination of 
the record in this case shows her sentences are eminently reasonable. 
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Stone-Jones' criminal record spans over a decade and consists primarily 
of drug, theft, and driving related offenses. (PSI, pp.6-10, 347-49.) Her 
convictions in these consolidated cases - for possession of methamphetamine 
with the intent to deliver, possession of methamphetamine and forgery -
constituted her second, third and fourth felony convictions, with her first felony 
conviction having also been for possessing methamphetamine, in 2003. (PSI, 
pp.6, 9-10, 345-47.) She has misdemeanor convictions for fraud - insufficient 
funds checks (two counts), petit theft ("Reduced from felony"), inattentive driving 
(amended from reckless driving), failure to purchase a driver's license (two 
counts); driving under the influence, failure to provide insurance (two counts), 
operating an unregistered vehicle, providing false information to and officer, 
public nuisance, and driving without privileges (three counts). (PSI, pp.7-9, 348.) 
She was also awaiting sentencing on another felony possession of 
methamphetamine charge when she was sentenced in these cases. (PSI, p.9.) 
While there is no question that Stone-Jones has substance abuse and 
mental health issues that have contributed to her convictions, there is equally 
little question that Stone-Jones has been afforded numerous opportunities for 
treatment of those issues but has been unable achieve any sustained period of 
sobriety or ability to conform her behavior to the law. (PSI, pp.6, 10, 15-22, 75-
84, 191-98, 353.) She has been placed on probation numerous times, was 
afforded the opportunities of both drug court and a rider, and has served a prison 
sentence. (PSI, pp.6-10, 17-18, 22, 348.) Despite these prior legal sanctions, 
and the rehabilitative programming associated with them, Stone-Jones has been 
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neither rehabilitated nor deterred from committing new crimes. Perhaps there is 
no better evidence of this than the fact that, within a week of being arrested for 
possessing methamphetamine in Valley County, Stone-Jones acted as the 
middleman in a methamphetamine sale and was arrested in Docket 41513 for 
possessing methamphetamine with the intent to deliver and possessing drug 
paraphernalia; just one month later, she was arrested in Docket 41607 after 
officers searched her house and found, among other things, methamphetamine, 
drug paraphernalia and counterfeit money. (PSI, pp.4-6, 9-10.) Given Stone-
Jones' tenaciousness in continuing to engage in illegal drug and theft related 
activities, even when already facing significant legal penalties, the district courts 
acted well within their discretion in concluding that a substantial prison sentence 
was not only warranted, but necessary both to protect society and to provide 
Stone-Jones with any meaningful chance for long-term rehabilitation. 
On appeal, Stone-Jones does not dispute any of the information in the 
PSI or contend that the district courts failed apply the correct legal standards or 
exercise reason in their sentencing decisions. She argues, however, that the 
courts failed to "adequately consider[]" several factors she deems mitigating, 
including what she characterizes as her "incredibly abusive childhood," "long-
term drug abuse" and "significant mental health issues," willingness to "help 
herself' by engaging in treatment, and progress in therapy. (Appellant's brief, 
pp.15-23.) All of the factors Stone-Jones cites were before the courts at the time 
of sentencing; that Stone-Jones believes the courts should have weighed this 
information differently does not establish an abuse of discretion. Moreover, 
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although the judges in both cases indicated they were aware of and had 
considered the mitigating and aggravating factors (see 9/19/13 Tr., p.222, L.23 -
p.232, L.6; 11/6/13 Tr., p.26, Ls.8-16), the district court in Docket 41513 
specifically articulated its consideration of the factors Stone-Jones identifies on 
appeal and its reasons for not elevating those factors above the needs to protect 
society and afford Stone-Jones a significant period of structured rehabilitation 
(9/119/13 Tr., p.222, L.23 - p.235, L.22). Because the court's reasoning applies 
equally to the sentencing determinations in both cases, the state hereby adopts 
that reasoning, as set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing in 
Docket 41513 (Appendix A), and submits based thereon that Stone-Jones has 
failed to establish an abuse of the courts' sentencing discretion. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the judgments and 
sentences in Docket Nos. 41513 and 41607. 
DATED this 24th day of July 2014. 
Deputy Attorne~~~I 
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up a lot of negative things about me, there are a 
lot of positive things about me, too. I -- I'm 
very proud of myself. I am very proud of myself. 
I do not feel that I'm a menace. I am a 
productive part of society. That Is all I have. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
Counsel, before Inquiring If there Is 
any legal cause as to why sentence could not be 
Imposed, one question that I have had and 
unfortunately the presentence materials don't do 
much to address It: It appears at page nine of 
the presentence materials near the bottom that 
there ls a pending felony possession of a 
controlled substance charge out of Valley County. 
In this situation, Is there any Information that 
either the State or the defense has as to the 
status of that case? 
MR. WOLLEN: I think I can speak to that, 
Your Honor. I've been In communication with 
Ms. Reilly, who is the prosecutor In 
Judge Wetherell's case, and she has spoken with 
the Valley County deputy prosecutor. It's my 
understanding that there's going be an offer made 
to have her plead guilty to simple possession of 
methamphetamlne in that case, and It would be a 
222 
1 concurrent sentence. I don't belleve they are 
2 seeking a great deal of time as far as fixed time 
3 on her. But Ms. Stone-Jones has not been up to 
4 Valley County to even address the warrant at this 
5 point, so she would have to handle that down the 
6 road. 
7 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 
8 MS. LONGHURST: And, Judge, I just want to 
9 clarify: That part of the plea agreement was I 
wouldn't pursue charges. That's not the same 
thing , There were charges after she was released 
and the purse was searched and when they arrested 
her. There was methamphetamlne found. That Is 
what that referred to, not the Valley County 
matter. 
MR. WOLLEN: And that was our understanding 
as well, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. Counsel, 
then, with that clarification, Is there any legal 
reasons as to why sentence could not be imposed? 
MS. LONGHURST: No, sir. 
MR. WOLLEN: No, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: In this case, I have considered 
the arguments by the State as well as the defense, 
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statement to the Court. In this situation, again, 
the Court certainly acknowledges the State's 
frustration and concern. Given the background of 
this case and the companion case currently 
scheduled for sentencing In front of Judge 
Wetherell and the Issues that have been ra ised, 
especially In my case, with the charge of 
possession with the Intent to deliver. 
Nonetheless, I am Inclined to agree to 
oa:e1PM 10 some extent with Mr. Wollen that from the 
03:61PM 9 
03:51PM 11 information available to the Court, It does appear 
oo:01P11 12 that, in fact, Ms. Stone-Jones, although to some 
00,01"" 13 extent supporting herself with the sale of 
03:51PM 14 controlled substances, prtmarlly was using the 
03:51PM 15 sale of controlled substances to support her 
03:51PII 16 habit, 
03:s,PU 17 Nonetheless, there Is significant 
03:s1P11 18 concern about that conduct on the part of the 
oo:s1P11 19 Court, and also concern In this situation about 
03:ll1PM 20 the prior record and the other Information that 
03:51?11 21 this Court has considered in making Its sentencing 
03:51p11 22 decision. 
03:5,,,... 23 I'm not going to belabor the facts of 
0362PM 24 the case. There was a suppression hearing that 
03:l!2PM 25 was held. I think ample evidence has been offered 
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as to the background of the case, what happened in 
terms of the search that was conducted, Again, as 
Ms. Stone-Jones has noted, she was forthcoming 
when confronted about her Involvement and what had 
happened there. 
She does have a prior record that, 
candidly, ls concerning for the Court. Of 
partlrular concern Is the prior felony possession 
of a controlled substance for which the case was 
disposed In December of 2003. There were also 
several misdemeanor charges Including at least 
four DWPs and one DUI. 
There were also a couple of other 
felony matters that were dismissed. One In 2010 
that Included six counts of forgery and one of 
grand theft, and one In 2011 that Included a 
charge of grand theft by receiving stolen 
property. 
And then we've also mentioned and 
discussed the pending controlled substance charge 
out of the state -- or out of Valley County, as 
well. 
Ms. Stone-Jones, to some extent, has 
alluded to this In her statement to the Court 
and I have certainly considered Ms. Stone-Jones' 03:5:IPM 25 about her upbringing, and Mr. Wollen, too. An 
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extremely troubl!ng upbringing. Sexually molested 
by her adoptive father to the point that at one 
time she took matters Into her own hands. And 
when her stepfather approached her, actually 
pointed a pistol at him and at that point he 
backed off In terms of that conduct, but then 
there were ongoing issues with physical and verbal 
abuse thereafter. 
It has been Indicated that 
ro53PM 10 Ms. Stone-Jones became aggressive and struggled 
o353PM 11 with the Issues raised there in her upbringing. 
0353PM 12 She turned to drugs, alcohol, and fighting. In 
0354PM 13 this situation, she married In 1985. Her husband 
03<14PM 14 was a biker. There were Issues of abuse In that 
0354PM 15 relationship, as well. 
o354PM 16 In this case, she was raped by another 
o354?M 17 biker, and her husband's criminal record Included 
oJ54PM 18 a variety of charges Including one of attempted 
o304PM 19 murder. 
o3$.4"M 20 She does have a son and a daughter, as 
03$.<PM 21 has been alluded to. The son does have at least 
0354PM 22 some criminal record that does include theft~ 
o354PM 23 related offences, as I understand It. 
o354PM 24 In this case, she has not held a steady 
o354PM 25 job since 2008, although apparently she Is a 
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certified nurse's assistant or a registered 
nurse's assistant, and did work for a time for the 
Idaho Nursing Home In -- at Grangeville, as I 
understand It. 
As has been noted, she does have 
significant mental health Issues, diagnosed with a 
brain lesion, and also diagnosis, according to 
her, that Include manic depression, post-traumatic 
stress disorder, extreme anxiety, bipolar 
disorder, elevated panic attacks, and agoraphobia. 
Actually, the Court noted that In the 
presentence materials, there was a report from an 
organization called the Riverfront -- Riverfront 
Community Center from May of 2010 where the 
diagnosis there included chronic post-traumatic 
stress disorder, panic disorder with agoraphobia, 
grief, early-onset dysthymla, polysubstance 
dependence, and also a closed head Injury. 
Nonetheless, Doctor Sombke had 
performed a psychological evaluation at the order 
of the Court, and his diagnosis was of amphetamine 
dependence, post-traumatic stress disorder and 
antlsoclal personality disorder. And In this 
case, I have found his diagnosis to be of some 
03:158PM 25 benefit in terms of my sentencing decision. 
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Among other things, Doctor Somkey noted 
an extensive history of drug abuse, something 
Ms. Stone-Jones has not denied. The physical and 
verbal abuse that she suffered at the hands of her 
husband. In this situation, also noted a 
functional impairment as a result of the 
antisocial personality disorder. 
And In this situation, had also noted 
treatment was available In the past for her 
substance abuse issues but had -- she had not 
benefitted from them. And I think he Is referring 
here, among other things, to the therapeutic 
community and some of the other programming that 
Ms. Stone-Jones had received. 
Doctor Somkey concluded that 
Ms. Stone-Jones Is a high risk to the public at 
large and a high risk to engage in future general 
violence. He describes her as Impulsive and 
Irresponsible, and concludes that she is most 
likely to continue In her violent, criminal, and 
substance abusing behavior especially without 
treatment. 
He recommended treatment for the PTSD 
through psychotropic medication and psychological 
counseling; she completes substance abuse 
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treatment; that she complete a cognitive thinking 
program to deal with her antisocial personality 
disorder; and concluded that If she got treatment, 
and as recommended, that her risk to the community 
would be reduced. 
In terms of Ms. Stone-Jones' substance 
abuse Issues, the conclusions were the involvement 
with the numerous number of drugs, including 
methamphetamlne, alcohol, marijuana, cocaine, and 
other hallucinogens. The GAIN-I assessment 
specifically diagnosed Ms. Stone-Jones with 
amphetamine dependence and alcohol abuse. 
And In this situation, among other 
things, noted that she had attended Drug Court In 
Grangeville In 2002, though It was discharged and 
went to prison. As Ms. Longhurst has noted, she 
was paroled for a time and sent back to prison to 
complete her sentence. 
She also attended therapeutic community 
at the South Boise Women's Correctional Center and 
did obtain some follow-up treatment while on 
parole In Grangevllle, as well. 
One thing I did note, and I think to 
03:58PM 24 some extent this perhaps explains Mr. Wollen's 
03:68PM 25 confusion by the comments In the presentence 
12/17/2013 12:03:30 PM Page 225 to 228 of 236 
I 03:MPM 
03·118PII I 0308PM 
OJ:59.PN 
o:t59PM 
03!59PM 
o:t~?M 
031!9PM 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
229 
investigation, at pages 22 and 23 In the 
investigator's comments and analysts. The 
presentence investigator noted at page 22 that 
"Concerning the mental health and substance abuse 
Issues It appears," and I am quoting here, "that 
her needs could be met In the community with 
Intensive treatment.• 
My take on that comment Is that that 
03·1!9PM 9 was based upon the comments contained In the 
oo511PM 10 evaluations themselves and that that was the 
001191'1.1 11 conclusion that the evaluators had made as to the 
03:511?M 12 avatlabllity or possibility of community treatment 
031liPM 13 If obtained. 
oo:lSUPM 14 I do believe and find that to be, In 
oo=- 15 fact, the recommendation of the presentence 
oa59PM 16 Investigator that the presentence Investigator, 
ou•,,.. 17 and specfflcally at page 23, and, again, I'm 
oo59PM 18 quoting now, "Based on the level of assessed need 
oo:_., 19 and risk and other protective factors, and as 
• 03:59PM 20 discussed above, that Ms. Stone-Jones would 
03:!lBPM 21 benefit from participation In rehabllltatlon 
programs and/or prosocial activities during a 
period of penal incarceration to address her 
current attitudes orientation and behaviors. 
"This may also assist her in gaining 
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1 the Insight she Is searching for and possibly help 
2 hern -- I'm changing that now. That was a typo 
3 there. She referred to Ms. Stone-Jones as a him, 
4 not a her. 
5 And, if fact, Counsel, If you don't 
6 object, I'm going to change that by 
7 lnterllneatlon, as well. 
8 MS. LONGHURST: No objection. 
9 
04:00PM 10 
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O<:OOPM 17 
O<:OOPM 18 
O<:tx>PM 19 
' O<:OOPM 20 
04:00PM 21 
MR. WOLLEN: No objection. 
THE COURT: I'll go ahead and make that 
change. 
-- "to obtain the skills to begin 
living a crime-free life In the future.• 
So the Court concludes that, In fact, 
what the presentence Investigator was saying Is 
t!nlt Ms. Stone-Jones Indeed would benefit from a 
period of Incarceration In the penitentiary with 
treatment, and that, In fact, It did not appear 
the presentence Investigator, given all the 
factors that I have mentioned and that were 
mentioned In the presentence report, that 
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consideration ts and must be protecting society. 
If I do nothing else, I must ensure that society 
is protected In the sentence that I impose. 
There are other considerations for the 
Court that include punishment, deterrence, both 
general and specific, and rehabllltatlon. 
candidly, this Is one of those cases where I think 
all of those considerations play a part In my 
sentencing decision. 
o.01Pu 10 In this situation, I think 
04:01PM 11 rehabllitatlon Is a factor. However, the Court Is 
o.·01?11 12 concerned by the fact that Ms. Stone-Jones has had 
0401PM 13 the benefit of numerous treatment opportunities In 
04,01P1o1 14 the community and has stlll not been able to 
04,01?11 15 conform her conduct to what would be expected of 
o.c:01"" 16 her. Although, for a time she was able to do so 
0401p1o1 17 In the state of Montana. 
0401P1o1 18 In this situation, again, I am troubled 
0401PM 19 by the conclusions by Doctor Somkey In his 
o.02P11 20 psychological evaluation of the high risk of -- to 
o,,az?M 21 the public at large and to engage In future 
0<,02P,. 22 general violence If, In fact, Ms. Stone-Jones does 
0402PM 23 not receive the treatment that she so obviously 
0<02PM 24 needs. And, therefore, the Court feels that 
O<C2PM 25 protection of society, Indeed, Is a significant 
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consideration, as well. 
Given her prior record, the nature of 
this offence, and the other Information available, 
certainly punishment Is a consideration, and as Is 
deterrence, both general to individuals in general 
and speclflcally to Ms. Stone-Jones herself. 
Whlle the Court in this case 
appreciates the recommendation from the defense 
that probation be a consideration, the Court does 
not feel based upon the Information available to 
It that probation Is a viable option In this case. 
And for that reason, also does not feel that this 
Is an appropriate case for a period of retained 
jurisdiction. 
Therefore, the Court In this case Is 
going to enter a judgment of conviction as to the 
charge of possession of a controlled substance 
with the Intent to deliver. Considering the drug 
enhancement and the maximum sentence avallable to 
me, nonetheless, I am not going to, In this case, 
impose a life term. I do not believe that would 
0o1,00PM 22 probation or treatment In the community would be IM:031'11 22 be appropriate. 
0o1:wPM 23 the appropriate option. o.:03?11 23 I do, though, feel that a significant 
04:00Pl,I 24 The Court In Imposing sentence Is 040:IPM 24 term would be appropriate with a reasonable period 
04:01PV 25 always guided by the Toohlll factors. Its primary 04:D:IPtl 25 of fixed time to allow Ms. Stone-Jones the 
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opportunity at rehabilitation while in a custodial 
setting as recommended. And also to give her a 
realistic opportunity for release Into the 
community at some time in the future. 
Therefore, a judgment of conviction 
will enter. I will sentence Ms. Stone-Jones to 
the custody of the Board of Correction for a term 
of 25 years. The first three years of that 
sentence will be fixed followed by 22 years 
0403P1o1 10 indeterminate. 
04:03PM 11 By my calculations, Ms. Stone-Jones, 
0403PM 12 you have, indeed, been in custody for over, 
0403PM 13 actually, 15 months. I show a total of 459 days 
04'04PM 14 that you have been in custody at one time or 
.,..04P .. 15 another In this case. And I am going to give you 
O<l .04PM 16 credit for that time toward the fixed portion of 
0404PM 17 your sentence. 
04:04PM 18 I'm also, in this case, going to order 
0.,04PM 19 restitution as requested, there being no objection 
°"°"""' 20 from the defense. And the defense, in fact, 
0404PM 21 having stipulating to it In the amount of 
0404PM 22 $1,464.46, and the Court will enter a civil 
.,...,..p., 23 judgment of restitution at this time accordingly. 
04.04PM 24 I am going to recommend to the Board of 
04"1'""' 25 Corrections, Ms. Stone-Jones, that you do be 
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considered for any and all forms of therapeutic 
counseling that may be available to you while in 
their custody. 
Since you have already had the benefit 
of the therapeutic community, I'm not going to 
specifically recommend that program, but I wlll 
leave It to the Board of Corrections as to which 
form of counseling may or may not be the most 
appropriate for you. I know you have indicated 
0406PM 10 that you believe it would be In the form of an 
04.osPM 11 Individual counseling program as opposed to a 
o-tOSPM 12 general or generic one. 
t>tOSPM 13 In this situation, I am not going to 
04.oePu 14 Impose any fine. And although candidly, I believe 
0405PM 15 that you have received a real benefit from the 
0405PM 16 representation of the public defender in this 
0405PM 17 case, I am also not going to order any public 
04:~" 18 defender reimbursement in light of the 
°"~ 19 penitentiary sentence that I have Imposed in this 
°"'-" 20 case today. 
0405Pl,I 21 I do need to advise you, ma'am, that 
04:0SPM 22 you do have the right to appeal this decision of 
0405PM 23 the Court. The appeal has to be filed within 
o.06PM 24 42 days from the date the judgment enters. If you 
04:0GPu 25 are a needy person and cannot afford it, the cost 
04:0SPM 
04 :05?M 
04:0SPM 
04:05PM 
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04.00PM 
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of the appeal could be borne at state expense, as 
well. 
In this case, ma'am, again, I felt that 
the penitentiary sentence, given the information 
available to me, was the most appropriate course 
and I have followed that. I have given you, with 
the fixed portion I have Imposed In this case, an 
opportunity to demonstrate an amenability to 
release back into the community after a certain 
0406PM 10 fixed period of time. 
..,oeeu 11 However, I have also Imposed a 
040SPM 12 significant indeterminate sentence in this case. 
04:oePM 13 And If, in fact, you are unable to demonstrate an 
04·06PM 14 amenability to release back Into the community, 
0411!PM 15 you will be in custody for a very long time • 
0406PM 16 Regardless, ma'am, I hope you are able 
0406PM 17 to take advantage of the treatment and other 
04aii>M 18 programming available to you. And if you are, and 
04QIPM 19 If at some point you do, in fact, get released 
0400PM 20 back into the community, I will go ahead and 
04oePM 21 hopefully not see you back in court again. Thank 
04.ooPu 22 you . 
04.oeP" 23 THE DEFENDANT: Thank you. 
0406PM 24 MR. WOLLEN: May we maintain the PSI, Your 
04:06PM 25 Honor? 
236 
04:06PM 1 THE COURT: Certainly. 
04·00Pa.c 2 
04:00PM 3 (End of requested proceedings.) 
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